by Jeremy Paner
Over the past few months, the United States government has relied upon its economic sanctions and anti-money laundering authorities to increase pressure on North Korea and its sponsor China. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the State Department have all recently contributed to this effort. Examples from earlier this month include the redesignation of North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism following Secretary Tillerson’s determination that North Korea “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” FinCEN’s Final Rule imposing prohibitions against China’s Bank of Dandong for its alleged sanctions evasion on behalf of North Korea, and OFAC’s designations and identifications of blocked property pursuant to Executive Order 13810.
Irrespective of the press releases announcing these sanctions, the most significant actions by the U.S. government have likely occurred behind the scenes in partnership with financial institutions and foreign partners. This information sharing with non-U.S. regulators and confidential targeted financial intelligence gathering against North Korean cover companies will likely steadily increase for the foreseeable future. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Last week, Trump announced that he would not certify Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Deal. Domestic U.S. legislation (the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act of 2015) requires the President to certify Iran’s compliance with the terms of the deal every 90 days. The President could, however, sign an Executive Order at any time resuming the sanctions suspended pursuant to the agreement. In other words, if Trump truly wanted to terminate the agreement with Iran, he could do so unilaterally at his discretion. There are no constraints to his abandoning the agreement.
No Immediate Effect
Trump’s October 13 announcement does not represent an immediate change to the U.S. sanctions targeting Iran. His non-certification does not terminate the agreement, and the secondary sanctions targeting Iran remain suspended. Congress will ultimately decide if the United States resumes its suspended sanctions and will expedite consideration of any legislation to reinstate the sanctions if such bills are proposed within 60 days of October 13. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $334,800 settlement with Richemont North America, Inc., d.b.a. Cartier, to resolve potential civil liability arising from apparent violations of the Kingpin Sanctions Regulations. According to OFAC, between late 2010 and early 2011, an individual made four purchases of jewelry from Cartier locations in California or Nevada, which Cartier then shipped to Shuen Wai Holding Limited, a designated entity in Hong Kong.
Treasury regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act require dealers in precious metals, precious stones, or jewels to establish and maintain anti-money laundering (AML) programs. These programs should be part of a larger compliance framework, which enable dealers to identify and prevent sales and shipments involving designated individuals and companies. Retailers such as Cartier, however, are generally exempt from the AML program requirement. As a result, retailers that ship products internationally should establish a process to identify prohibited dealings, independently of any legally mandated program requirements. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
On Friday, the United States significantly increased its sanctions targeting the Government of Venezuela. These new sanctions, authorized under Executive Order, are generally similar to the sectoral sanctions targeting Russia following that country’s purported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine. There is, however, an important distinction between the sanctions programs. The Russian sectoral sanctions are generally list-based, and the prohibitions are limited to entities contained on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List, including unlisted companies under the so-called 50 Percent Rule. Compliance with these sanctions requires efficient resolution of screening hits on large Russian businesses such as Sberbank, Gazprom, and Lukoil. In contrast with this screening and resolution exercise, Venezuela sanctions now require significant due diligence resources to identify prohibited dealings with the Venezuelan government. Whereas compliance with the sectoral sanctions on Russia requires banks to drink from a fire hose, the new sanctions on Venezuela require efforts analogous to finding a needle in a haystack.
The Executive Order prohibits United States persons from certain dealings in debt, securities, and distributions of profits involving the Government of Venezuela. United States persons are prohibited from dealings in new debt with a maturity greater than 90 days of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), and greater than 30 days for debt of the Government of Venezuela, other than PdVSA. While the term “debt” includes bonds, the prohibition on dealings with bonds issued by the Government of Venezuela is not limited to those issued after the effective date of the Executive Order, or by maturity date. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Last week, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced its assessment of a $2 million civil money penalty against ExxonMobil for alleged egregious violations of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. According to OFAC, the violations arise from May 2014 dealings ExxonMobil had with Igor Sechin, in his official capacity as the President of Rosneft OAO. OFAC has previously addressed the sanctions compliance risk arising from entering into contracts in which designated individuals bind undesignated entities, but the agency had not previously punished a company under that scenario.
OFAC designated Sechin in April 2014 under one of the Ukraine/Russia blocking authorities. As of the date of his designation, OFAC generally prohibited U.S. companies from transacting or dealing with Sechin. U.S. companies were not prohibited, however, from all dealings with Rosneft. The Russian state-owned oil company is subject to restrictions involving certain debt and Russian oil projects, but unlike Sechin, the company is not blocked.
While OFAC separately defines the prohibitions applicable in each if its sanctions programs, economic sanctions regulations generally prohibit transacting or dealing with blocked individuals. For example, Executive Order 13661 and § 589.201 of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations prohibit companies from both dealing with property of designated individuals and providing or receiving services to or from those persons. ExxonMobil filed a civil complaint in the Northern District of Texas concurrently with the penalty announcement, which challenges OFAC’s determination that it received prohibited services from Sechin.
by Jeremy Paner
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced significant actions targeting Chinese companies and individuals for their commercial involvement with North Korea. These actions follow Trump’s vague tweet on June 20, in which he stated “[w]hile I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!” In light of today’s designations and proposed rulemaking, that message appears to signal a willingness by the United States to directly target China. Non-U.S. companies should carefully consider this dramatic policy shift with an understanding of the broad scope of the current sanctions authorities. The Treasury Department may target North Korea’s commercial partners irrespective of their geographic location.
USA PATRIOT Act Section 311
The most significant action is likely the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to sever China’s Bank of Dandong from the U.S. financial system under its 311 authority. Although this is not the first listing of a Chinese bank, it will very likely be the most disruptive. In 2007, the Treasury Department labeled the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern, and in 2012 listed China’s Bank of Kunlun under an Iran-related sanctions authority. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Earlier today, President Trump announced upcoming revisions to the Cuban embargo. The announcement should be viewed as a preview of coming changes, as the current Treasury and Commerce general licenses will remain in effect until those departments implement amended regulations. During his speech in Miami, Trump characterized these changes as a “complete” cancellation of the Obama policy and media reports have generally echoed this significant overstatement. Irrespective of the tonal shift from the current occupant of the White House, current travel and business between Cuba and the United States will generally remain unchanged.
Prior to President Trump’s announcement, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a series of 12 frequently asked questions on the upcoming sanctions changes. These FAQs are interesting for a number of reasons. First, contrary to the general sanctions practice in the United States, changes in the sanctions regulations will not affect existing contracts. This means there will be no disruption to current business relationships formed under the existing rules. Secondly, the revisions to the regulations appear quite minimal. Trump will only direct OFAC to limit one form of authorized travel and prohibit “direct transactions” with Cuban military, intelligence, or security services entities contained on list to be published by the State Department. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a decision in Epsilon Electronics, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control et al., No. 16-5118, __ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. 2017), which largely affirms the lower court’s granting of summary judgement in favor of the government defendant. The D.C. Circuit Court, however, remanded the matter for consideration of five of the 34 alleged sanctions violations and a recalculation of the total $4,073,000 civil monetary penalty arising from alleged Iran sanctions violations. This decision continues the recent trend of increased judicial scrutiny of national security-related actions by the Executive branch. Foreign and domestic companies that are the subjects of OFAC enforcement investigations should consider seeking judicial review of administrative records that do not clearly explain the agency’s consideration of potentially exculpatory information. Continue reading
by Jeremy Paner
Yesterday, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 271 Syrians accused of serving the Government of Syria as employees of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). OFAC announced this action in response to the April 4 sarin gas attack in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria. The U.S. government used sanctions to respond to previous chemical weapons attacks. On January 12, 2017 OFAC announced the designation of six SSRC officials following three separate chlorine gas attacks against civilians.
OFAC is likely to continue designating individuals and entities the U.S. government alleges to be responsible for chemical attacks on civilians. This could lead to targeting significant Iranian interests that would jeopardize the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In the meantime, compliance programs should assess their current procedures against OFAC screening expectations. Continue reading
by Steven Pelak and Jeremy Paner
Last week, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced the settlement of a civil fraud suit against American University of Beirut (AUB) and payment of a $700,000 penalty for alleged False Claims Act (FCA) violations arising from OFAC sanctions violations. The alleged violations arose from false certifications of economic sanctions compliance made by AUB to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in connection with U.S. Government grants. According to the settlement, AUB provided USAID annual certifications that it did not provide “material support or resources” to designated entities or individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
As part of the settlement, AUB admitted to a series of sanctions violations involving three separate Hizballah designated entities. AUB acknowledged that it provided journalism training workshops attended by representatives of two designated Hizballah media entities, and separately promoted a designated Hizballah construction company through its inclusion on a publicly accessible online database. AUB agreed to pay $700,000 and strengthen its compliance program to resolve the civil action. Continue reading